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THE USE OF FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES
TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS
Alexander W. Whitaker IV
By late 1992, as the famine in Somalia worsened and the
inability of the world community to respond became ever more
apparent, the Bush administration decided to commit U.S.
troops to help create a secure environment for the delivery
of relief supplies to that troubled country. What would be
known as Operation Restore Hope was announced by President
Bush on December 4, 1992. l It followed United Nations
endorsement of the plan the previous day in Security Council
Resolution 794. 2
Before the announcement of Operation Restore Hope the
Attorney General had provided President Bush the advice of
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel as to
the legality of undertaking such an operation without
explicit Congressional authorization. In his cover letter
to that opinion, Attorney General William P. Barr concluded
that President Bush indeed had authority in his
"constitutional role as Commander in Chief and Chief
1 J. Hirsch & R. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections
on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking 46 (1995).
2 U.N. Sec. Counsel Res. 794 (3145 th mtg.) at U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).

Executive" to undertake the operation. 3 In addition to
citing the President's authority for the operation under
international law-specifically UN Security Council
Resolution 794—Barr cited the President's authority to use
American forces for the protection of U.S. troops already in




Interestingly, however, both the Attorney General in
his letter and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in its
opinion found justification for the President's proposed
action in the protection of foreign nationals as well. "I
further conclude," wrote the Attorney General, "that you
have authority to use those military personnel to protect
Somalians and other foreign nationals in Somalia." 5 While
not stated explicitly, the clear implication of his
statement was that the President could commit U.S. forces
for the protection of non-U. S. nationals without the consent
or authorization of Congress. That implication is clearer
still in the accompanying OLC opinion. 6
! 16 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 6 (1992) [hereinafter OLC Somalia
opinion]
.
"U.S. nationals were present in Somalia before the beginning of
Operation Restore Hope as participants in international relief efforts
already underway. There were American civilians in country working with
relief organizations. In addition, there were U.S. military personnel
in Somalia in connection with Operation Provide Relief, the U.S.-
coordinated transport (primarily by air) of humanitarian relief to
Somalia. There was at the time considerable concern about the safety of
all of these persons, as neither the airport at Mogadishu nor other
staging areas had been secured.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at 8.

The OLC opinion outlines and discusses the various
grounds on which the President could take action under his
power as Commander in Chief. The opinion recounts the
domestic sources usually cited when asserting the
President's authority to use military force for the
protection of U.S. nationals abroad. 7 It stresses the
President's authority to use troops in support of a UN
Resolution, and notes the tacit contemplation of the
Congress that the President might use U.S. forces in the
Somalian crisis. 8
Of principle interest with respect to this paper's
subject, however, is the following language of the OLC
opinion
:
Nor is the President's power strictly limited
to the protection of American citizens in
Somalia. Past military interventions that
extended to the protection of foreign
nationals provide precedent for action to
protect endangered Somalians and other non-
United States citizens. 9
7 E.g. U.S. v. Verdugu Urquidiz, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990), cited in OLC
Somalia Opinion 9 (1992)
.
8 OLC Somalia Opinion at 12-14. Even though the Security Council
Resoluton "authorized" the use of force, rather than obliged the U.S. to
use its military forces in support of the Somalia operation, the OLC
opinion stresses the Korea War precedent of the President committing
forces without prior Congressional authorization. A U.N. Resolution,
the OLC opinions says, can furnish an independent ground for
Presidential use of force abroad. Id. Although this broader subject is
outside the scope of my paper, it should be noted that this assertion of
Presidential authority via U.N. Resolution is far from accepted,
particularly by the Legislative Branch.
9 Id. at 11.

The opinion then cites as precedent U.S. actions in the
Dominican Republic in 1965 and during the Boxer Rebellion in
China in 1900 and 1901. 10
What is not readily apparent from the Attorney
General's letter or the OLC opinion is the extent to which
the protection of foreign nationals was offered as an
independent ground to justify U.S. force without
Congressional authorization. While other legal bases for
such military action were put forth in the opinion, each
was proffered as if it provided a legal basis for action
independent of the others. I will assume for purposes of
this paper that the protection of foreign nationals is being
offered as an independent justification for the President's
use of force without Congressional consent, and with the
presumption that the Department of Justice views such use of
force as valid under international law.
The pages which follow will explore whether in the
President's constitutional roles as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive he may use military force for the protection
of non-U. S. nationals in the same way he might be able to do
for the protection of U.S. nationals. I will consider the
extent to which the War Powers Resolution confirms or alters
his constitutional prerogatives in this regard. I will
id.

attempt to identify the legal rationales supporting
arguments for such a use of force, and evaluate whether they
are defensible under post-U.N. Charter notions of
international law.
The assertion of a right to intervene for the
protection or rescue of nationals not of one's own state
carries with it many difficult questions. If permissible,
to what extent would such action be predicated on the
request, permission or acquiescence of the threatened
nationals' home state? What would prevent such a right of
intervention from being expanded in practice to justify all
manner of violations of sovereignty? Would such a right of
intervention to protect foreign nationals permit
intervention in the affected nationals' own state as well as
a third location? There are also difficulties with not
recognizing a limited right to protect foreign nationals,
both from political and humanitarian perspectives. These
are questions I will address as I consider the possible
legal grounds for the use of force for the protection
of foreign nationals, and as I attempt in closing to define
a limited doctrine of using force for the protection of
foreign nationals by the United States.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
ABILITY TO USE FORCE TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS
The Constitution certainly does not address which
branch of the U.S. Government can authorize the use of
military force to protect foreign nationals. Indeed, the
fledgling nation's near universal desire to avoid foreign
entanglements, its limited military resources and more
pressing security concerns (the British, the French, the
Spanish, the Indians) suggest that using forces to protect
another nation's nationals was probably not a subject
seriously discussed by the Founders. To determine where the
Constitution rests authority for such actions, then, one
must inevitably consider the larger questions as to which
branch of Government generally has the right to authorize
the use of military force.
The question, then, like so many others in this area,
becomes a subset of the larger "invitation to struggle"
left us by the Founders when they placed with the
Legislative Branch the power to declare war, 11 and with the
Executive the responsibility of Commander in Chief of the
11 U.S. Const. Art I §8, cl. 11 ("To declare War, grant Letters of Marque




While a thoroughgoing review of this larger debate is
outside the scope of this paper, 13 it is worthwhile to
consider where the Framers considered the outside limits of
the Executive's scope of action to be in this shared
responsibility.
The draft Constitution gave the Legislative Branch the
power to "make war." This was, on motion of James Madison,
changed to "declare war," to preserve for the Executive "the
power to repel sudden attacks." 14 It was sudden attacks
that concerned the drafters, that is, those attacks whose
fury or imminence precluded legislative debate and
authorization in order to be successfully repelled. The
Framers left to the Congress the power to initiate war. 15
There is no suggestion that Congress left to the Executive
other uses of force: as both Abraham Sofaer and Peter Raven-
Hansen note, the Constitution gave the Congress the power to
grant letters of marque and reprisal, which encompassed
2 U.S. Const. Art II §2, cl . 1 ("The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States...") .
! Indeed, Peter Raven-Hansen observes that by the early 1990s the
subject had been discussed by more than 50 books and 250 scholarly
articles. Peter Raven Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War
Clause, in G. Stern & M. Halperin , eds
.
, The U.S. Constitution and the
Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives 29 (1994). For
a thorough overview of the Framers' views, see Charles A. Lofgren, War-
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale L.J.
672 (1972) .
14 Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The
Origins 31 (1976) .
15 See Lofgren, supra note 13.
7

those uses of force short of formal war common then. 16 As
Judge Sofaer further notes, however, the Article I, Section
10 restraint on states engaging in war "unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of
delay" logically suggests "[o]ne can reasonably contend that
at least this much power must be vested in the President to
protect the United States as a whole." 17
Beyond this general guidance, the Constitution speaks
little to the division of responsibilities between the
Executive and Legislative Branches concerning the use of
military force. The Framers, perhaps intentionally by their
generality and their distribution of powers in this area,
indeed left to their successors to decide how this power
would be shared, in light of contemporary security concerns.
The Federalist Papers do little more than the
Constitution to answer the question. The articles
comprising the Federalist Papers were designed principally
to answer objections to the proposed Constitution from a
skeptical public, those objections largely being concerns
about a national government with enhanced powers over that
under the Articles of Confederation, and the introduction of
a strong executive. To the extent the Federalist Papers
speak to matters of national defense, the effort of the
16 Peter Raven-Hansen, supra note 13, at 30, 31, and Sofaer, supra note
14, at 4.
17 Sofaer, supra note 14, at 4.
8

writers is often given to convincing the reader that there
should be a "common defence" coordinated by a national
government in the first place, and that the national
government should be properly equipped for that purpose. 18
The writers were attempting to convince their readers that
the indefinite power to maintain armies, even in peacetime,
was necessary. 19 The writers maintained in their articles
the relatively straightforward dichotomy between declaring
war (the Congress's responsibility) and directing war or
repelling sudden attacks (the President's responsibility).
Hamilton stressed the importance of the strong Executive.
"Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand,
"
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74. "The direction of war
implies the direction of the common strength; and the power
of directing and employing the common strength, forms a
usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
authority." 20 In Federalist No. 70 Hamilton defended a
"vigorous" Executive: "Energy in the Executive is a leading
character in the definition of good government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign
8 The Federalist No. 23 (A. Hamilton)
19 The Federalist No. 41 (J. Madison).
20 The Federalist No. 74 (A. Hamilton)

attacks...." 21 To a public suspicious of a strong executive,
though, it was hardly likely that even Hamilton would argue
that the Executive under the new Constitution would be
empowered to use force without the involvement of the
Legislative Branch.
In none of the records of the Convention or in the
Federalist Papers is there to be found the suggestion that
the Executive acts independently of the Legislative Branch
in matters military, or that the involvement of Congress was
limited to only those situations in which formal war was
declared. As Judge Sofaer notes, "Congress was seen by all
who commented on the issue as possessing exclusive control
of the means of war. No ratifier suggested that the
President would be able unilaterally to utilize forces
provided for one purpose in some unauthorized military
venture. Undeclared wars were far too important a part of
the international scene for on safely to assume that the
Framers and ratifiers meant to leave that area of power to
the President." 22
If we accept that the Framers intended the President to
have the power to "repel a sudden attack, " it is worthwhile
to ask how the Framers might have viewed the Executive's use
of force to protect foreign nationals under that grant of
21 The Federalist No. 70, at 454 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library College
Edition, n.d. )
.
22 Sofaer, supra note 14, at 56.
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authority. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how
the use of force to protect foreign nationals, per se, can
be equated with "repelling a sudden attack" on the United
States. While it is true that such protection or rescue
might have the compelling suddenness that begs for prompt
action, while not allowing for thorough legislative
deliberation, it does not thereby follow that the action
shares the extreme national interest for self-preservation
as does an attack on the nation itself. While there may be
circumstances where such intervention will go hand-in-glove
with an action for self-preservation, it is generally
difficult to argue that the assistance of foreign nationals
rises to such a stature. 23
In this respect, the use of force for the protection of
foreign nationals differs conceptually from the use of force
by the United States to protect its own nationals. In
protecting its own nationals the United States extends to
its threatened citizens the protection they would expect if
similarly threatened by a foreign sovereign were they within
3 One situation where the rescue of a foreign national could rise to an
act of national self-preservation might be action taken to protect a
national who is acting as the nation' s agent in a matter of national
security. For example, a state might find it necessary to protect an
intelligence operative who possesses information that if discovered
could imperil the national security. There, although the nexus of
citizenship would be lacking, an arguably as strong a connection would
exist between the foreign national and the state which seeks to protect
him. Another example where the "nationality" nexus would be lacking,
but where the connection with the state would be unquestionable, is the
case of U.S. enlisted servicemembers who are not U.S. citizens.
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their own country. The attack on the U.S. national is
viewed as an attack on the U.S. itself, an affront to its
sovereignty. As Ian Brownlie observes, "The theory behind
this seems to be that the nationals of a state are an
extension of the state itself, a part as vital as the state
territory, and that the raison d'etre of the state is the
protection of its citizens." 24 In the leading federal case
dealing with actions taken to protect citizens abroad, the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Southern District of
New York in 1860 wrote:
Now, as it respects the interposition of the
executive abroad, for the protection of the lives
or property of the citizen, the duty must, of
necessity, rest in the discretion of the
president. Acts of lawless violence, or of
threatened violence to the citizen or his
property, cannot be anticipated and provided for;
and the protection to be effectual or of any
avail, may, not unfrequently require the most
prompt and decided action. Under our system of
government, the citizen abroad is as much entitled
to protection as the citizen at home. The great
object and duty of government is the protection of
the lives, liberty, and property of the people
composing it, whether abroad or at home; and any
government failing in the accomplishment of the
object, or the performance of the duty is not
worth preserving. [Emphasis added.] 25
The forcefulness of the court's language with respect to the
Executive taking action to protect the nation's citizens
abroad seems to underscore the many ways such lofty
21 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force By States 289
(1963) .
25 Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. Ill, 112 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.C.N.Y 1860)
12

responsibilities would be lacking were the Executive seeking
to take action to protect foreign nationals.
The only Supreme Court case discussing the Executive's
use of force to protect a foreign national is In re
Neagle, 26 an 1890 case concerning whether a U.S. deputy
marshal (Neagle) had the statutory authority to defend a
Supreme Court justice (Stephen J. Field) by killing the
latter's assailant. Neagle, as a result of his action, was
charged with homicide and held in custody by one Sheriff
Cunningham. The Court, in finding the warrant holding
Neagle unconstitutional, discusses in broad language the
supremacy of the national government, and its
responsibilities to take measures to protect judges and to
execute the laws faithfully.
In this context, the Court notes the 1853 case of
Martin Koszta, a Hungarian who had made his declaration of
intent to become a U.S. citizen, but had not yet become
naturalized. The court recounts that
While in Smyrna [Koszta] was seized by command of
the Austrian consul-general at that place, and
carried on board the Hussar, an Austrian vessel,
where he was held in close confinement. Capt
.
Ingraham, in command of the American sloop of war
St. Louis, arriving in port at that critical
period, and ascertaining that Koszta had with him
his naturalization papers, demanded his surrender
to him, and was compelled to train his guns upon
the Austrian vessel before his demands were
complied with. It was, however, to prevent
26 Cunningham, Sheriff, v. Neagle (In re Neagle), 135 U.S. 1
.
, 10 S.Ct
658, 34 L.Ed. 55. (1890)
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bloodshed, agreed that Koszta should be placed in
the hands of the French consul subject to the
result of diplomatic negotiations between Austria
and the United States. The celebrated
correspondence between Mr. Marcy, secretary of
state, and Chevalier Hulsemann, the Austrian
minister at Washington, which arose out of this
affair, and resulted in the release and
restoration to liberty of Koszta, attracted a
great deal of public attention; and the position
assumed by Mr. Marcy met the approval of the
country and of congress, who voted a gold medal to
Capt . Ingraham for his conduct in the affair. 2
The Court characterizes the episode as "one of the most
remarkable in the history of our foreign relations" 28 and
"an attractive historical incident." 2 ' It closes its
discussion of the case by asking: "Upon what act of congress
then existing can any one lay his finger in support of the
action of our government in this matter?" 30
Perhaps given this last rhetorical question and the
lack of other Supreme Court precedent on the question of
executive decisions to use force to protect non-U. S.
nationals, it is understandable that the OLC opinion on
Somalia would cite this case. 31 The case ultimately,
however, does little to support the notion that the
Executive can intervene for the protection of foreign
nationals without the involvement of Congress. Indeed, the




1 OLC Somalia Opinion at 14, n.3.
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whole thrust of the Neagle case is the responsibility of the
national government to protect its officials and agents,
those with extremely strong ties to the government. The
Court's approving discussion of the Koszta episode was
premised on Koszta' s apparent nexus to his country of choice
by his having filed a declaration of intent. The Court,
seeking to illustrate the national government's inherent
responsibilities to protect its officers and agents, would
hardly have used the case had this nexus been lacking. It
is difficult indeed to extrapolate the case of almost-
citizen Koszta to that of a starving Somali or other
foreign national lacking any personal connection to the
United States, and certainly a stretch to use the Supreme
Court's illustrative use of the episode for one proposition
to fashion a rule of law for another.
The courts, then, like the Constitution, fail to give
any compelling Constitutional basis for the Executive using
force without the participation of Congress for a purpose
short of repelling attack, either against the United States
or, by extension, its citizenry. Absent that authority, it
is difficult to discern any Constitutional basis for the
President's using force without Congressional involvement
solely for the protection of foreign nationals.
15

POSSIBLE STATUTORY LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION OF CONGRESS
Prior to passage of the War Powers Resolution, there
was one statute that could be read as addressing this
subject. 32 The Act of July 27, 1868 addresses the unjust
imprisonment of U.S. citizens by foreign governments. Now
popularly referred to as the "Hostage Act," the
statute directs the President, when such imprisonment
appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of
American citizenship, to demand the citizen's release, and
if the release is not forthcoming, the President "shall use
such means, not amounting to acts of war as he may think
necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release. " 3 ~
[Emphasis added.] While it is not clear what Congress meant
by means "not amounting to acts of war," one could argue
that Congress by this statute specifically reserved unto
itself the decision to use force to effect the release of an
imprisoned citizen. Applied to the Koszta case, or even
to the case of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, one could
argue that the Executive was precluded from action absent
3; Act July 27, 1868, c. 249, s.3, 15 Stat. 224. Now codified at 22
U.S.C. §1732.
5 Id. Note that in 1989 Congress added "and not otherwise prohibited by




Congressional authorization to the contrary. 34 Further, one
could argue that as Congress has spoken in this area,
authorizing the President to act, but only in the case of
citizens abroad, and then with constraints, the Executive is
thereby not free to act outside that authorization for the
protection of foreign nationals without a compelling and
vital national security interest analogous to repelling a
sudden attack.
The basis for the Executive using force to protect
foreign nationals without Congressional authorization is
more problematic in light of the 1973 War Powers Resolution.
Section 2 of the Act, which enunciates the purpose and
policy of the resolution, purports to define the limits of
the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief
to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities, or situations
"where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances." 35 Those situations, say
34 Given the considerable historical precedent for Presidential use of
force to rescue or protect U.S. citizens, however, it is more likely
that Congress contemplated the President's use of limited military-
force, in addition to diplomatic tools, to effect the release of
endangered Americans. See, A. Mikva & J. Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and
the 'Hostage Act,' 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 292. In the authors' comprehensive
review of the legislative history of the Act they note that "The
President is given broad discretion in choosing among diplomatic
military and economic means of bringing pressure or influence to bear on
a foreign state that has imprisoned American citizens unlawfully. His
response must be within constitutional bounds, must not amount to an act
of war...." Id. at 344. The authors note that the legislative history is
"almost entirely unilluminating" with respect to the words "not
amounting to acts of war, id. at 302, but describe the enactment of the
bill as motivated not by a desire to limit the President's authority,
but to encourage Executive action. Still, they note, there is nothing




the resolution, are only three: "(1) a declaration of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces." 3 * Of the
three, only the last affords the President latitude to act
without authorization of Congress. It is difficult to see
how under this narrow remit the President could employ U.S.
forces to protect or rescue foreign nationals, if the
situation clearly implies the possibility of hostile action.
The constitutionality of portions of the War Powers
Resolution has been debated since its inception. While the
joint resolution itself states that nothing in the
resolution "is intended to alter the constitutional
authority of the Congress or of the President," 37 clearly
the view of the Executive has been that "the resolution
defin[es] the President's powers in ways which would
strictly limit his constitutional authority." 38 While the
Executive has taken the view that "This policy statement is
not to be viewed as limiting presidential action in any
substantive matter," 39 it is clear that limits on
Presidential action are exactly what Congress intended in
35 50 U.S.C. §1541 (a) .
36 50 U.S.C. §1541 (c) .
37 50 U.S.C. §1547(d) (1) .
5 President Nixon' s Message to Congress Vetoing the War Powers
Resolution, 9 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 43 (Oct. 24, 1973).
3S 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1980) ("Presidential Power to Use




attempting to codify the powers of the Commander in Chief.
There has been debate whether the language of Section 2
of the Act purports to be exhaustive or not. The use of the
word "only" certainly suggests Congress intended the three
situations outlined to be the only ones in which the
President in its view could use force. Noticeably absent
from that list, however, is the President's ability to use
force to protect or rescue American citizens abroad. (This
can be argued as evidence that Congress obviously did not
mean the list to be exhaustive, or else it would have listed
the protection or rescue of Americans.)
Interestingly, the Senate version of the resolution
would have allowed the President to introduce forces into
potentially hostile situations:
to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals
of the United States, as rapidly as possible from
(A) any situation on the high seas involving a
direct and imminent threat to the lives of such
citizens and national, or (B) any country in which
such citizens and nationals are present with the
express or tacit consent of the government of such
country and are being subjected to a direct and
imminent threat to their lives, either sponsored
by such government or beyond the power of such
government to control; but the President shall
make every effort to terminate such a threat
without using the Armed Forces of the United
States, and shall, where possible, obtain the
consent of the government of such country before
using the Armed Forces of the United States to
protect citizens and nationals of the United
States being evacuated from such country...40
40 S. 440, 93 rd Cong., 1 st Sess. (1973), reprinted in T.M. Franck & M.J.
Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Material
and Simulations 586, 587 (2d ed., 1973).
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Even under this more expansive recognition of Presidential
authority to use force (which was rejected) the President in
Congress 1 view only had authority to use force to protect
U.S. nationals.
In testimony in 1975 before the Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House
Committee on International Relations, State Department Legal
Advisor Monroe Leigh was questioned about the legality of
using U.S. forces for rescuing Americans in Indochina. He
confirmed the Executive's view that such action was within
the President's constitutional authority. 41 During the
hearings he was asked by Representative Stephen Solarz, "Can
you think of any situation in which the President would have
an inherent constitutional authority to commit American
forces to combat situations that are not listed in section
2(c) of the bill other than a situation in which he is
attempting to rescue American nationals from a situation
when they are in jeopardy?" Leigh later provided his answer
for the record:
Besides the three situations listed in subsection
2(c) of the War Powers Resolution it appears that
the President has the constitutional authority to
use the Armed Forces to rescue American citizens
abroad, to rescue foreign nationals where such
action directly facilitates the rescue of U.S.
51 War Powers: A Test of Compliance: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on
International Relations, 94 th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1975), reprinted in
Franck & Glennon, supra note 40, at 603, 604.
20

citizens abroad, to protect U.S. Embassies and
Legations abroad, to suppress civil insurrections,
to implement and administer the terms of an
armistice or cease-fire designed to terminate
hostilities involving the United States, and to
carry out the terms of security commitments
contained in treaties. We do not, however,
believe that any such list can be a complete one,
just as we do not believe that any single
definitional statement can clearly encompass every
conceivable situation in which the President's
Commander in Chief authority could be
exercised. [Emphasis added.] 42
Even though Leigh stressed the non-exhaustive character of
his list, it is interesting that when describing the
Executive's use of force to protect foreign nationals he
limited it to situations in which such action was not merely
co-incident with the rescue of American nationals, but
actually facilitated such rescue. This certainly is a much
more narrow assertion of the President's constitutional
power to use force for this purpose than that claimed by the
Office of Legal Council's Operation Restore Hope opinion. 43
The issue of the permissibility of using force to
rescue foreigners arose again in the 1977 hearings of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee considering proposed
amendments to the War Powers Resolution. In his testimony,
then-Professor Abraham Sofaer, generally a defender of the
President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief, suggested
that amending Section 2(c) of the resolution to include the
42 Id. at 606.
,3OLC Somalia Opinion at 11
21

protection of Americans and the power to forestall direct
and imminent threats of attack on the U.S. would
"essentially permit, in advance almost all the uses of force
ever undertaken by a President." 44 He noted, though, that
if the statute were then read as exhaustive rather than
merely illustrative, what it "most clearly seems to prevent
is the use of force to protect or rescue foreign nationals."
"On this point," Sofaer continued, "though Presidents might
be constitutionally empowered in some situations to protect
foreign nationals, as Jefferson and Madison did, Congress
could in my judgement limit this power." 45 He later suggests
that a fund cut-off by Congress directed at an efforts such
as rescuing foreigners would be "unlikely to pose any
constitutional difficulty, " 46 suggesting that to the extent
the President had any authority to undertake such
operations, they could be limited simply by a restriction on
funding. If, as Sofaer suggests, there is no constitutional
problem with Congress by its power of the purse precluding a
President from taking action to rescue foreigners, it is
difficult to argue that the President has an inherent
Constitutional power to use force unilaterally for that
purpose
.
" War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations , 95 th Cong. 1 st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Franck & Glennon,
supra note 40, at 612.
45 Id.
i6 Id. at 613.
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The War Powers Resolution was not amended to expand the
provisions of Section 2(c). Moreover, the already
questionable constitutionality of some portions of the War
Powers Resolution were cast into further doubt by the
Supreme Court's 1983 ruling in I.N.S. v. Chadha, A1 which
invalidated the legislative veto. To the extent the War
Powers Resolution incorporates a legislative veto (by its
provisions for overriding Presidential action by concurrent
resolution), it would be unlikely to survive scrutiny under
the principles of the Chadha decision. This does not mean,
however, that other provisions of the Resolution would
similarly be invalid.
In the end, the War Powers Resolution makes little
difference as to the existence of an Executive right to
employ forces for the protection of foreign nationals.
If that prerogative existed before the Resolution, it is
unlikely that the Resolution changes it, particularly in
view of its omission of other traditional uses of force by
the Executive, such as that for the rescue of American
citizens. If, on the other hand, the President did not
before 1973 have the authority to use troops in such a
fashion without the participation of the Congress, the War
Powers Resolution does little to change that, save perhaps
to invite a confrontation after 60 days or upon concurrent
57 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed. 2d 317 (1983;
23

resolution of the Congress, should the operation not have
been completed and Congress object. What the debate about
the War Powers Resolution does add to this discussion is the
clear impression that the 1992 OLC opinion goes much farther
than previous statements on the subject by the State
Department and even by scholars with a generally sympathetic
view toward Presidential latitude in matters of foreign
relations and the use of force.
USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS:
SOME EXAMPLES OF U.S. PRACTICE
Both in evaluating Presidential claims of authority to
use force for the protection of foreign nationals without
Congressional approval, and in considering the acceptability
of such a use of force under international law, it is
essential to review actual U.S. practice in the area. The
number of times force has been employed since the country's
founding has been catalogued at over 200, 48 with a
considerable portion of those involving unilateral Executive
action, and few involving a declaration of war. A sizable
percentage of those actions involved intervention to protect
American nationals. Milton Offut records at least seventy
43 Raven-Hansen, supra note 12, at 29 & n. 3 at 46, citing Ellen C.
Collier, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, I19t




such instances between 1813 and 1927. 49 Although I have
found no thoroughgoing compilation of instances the U.S. has
used force to protect foreign nationals, the number of times
is undoubtedly far smaller.
Aside from intervention pursuant to mutual defense
treaties, U.S. military action to protect or rescue foreign
nationals has almost always--if not always--been associated
with some other usually more important foreign policy
objective. To the extent that both protection of U.S.
nationals and protection of foreign nationals have been
offered as rationales for military intervention, the
protection of foreign nationals has always been the
secondary concern. While it is the case, as the OLC opinion
suggests, that the U.S. has offered "protection of foreign
nationals" as a basis justifying the use of force, I am
unable to identify a single instance in which that was the
sole justification, or even the primary justification for
such action. In short, while the rationale has been offered
on occasion to bolster the claim that use of force was
justified, the U.S. has evidently never felt sufficiently
committed to the principle to take action on that basis
alone. As we shall see, even in the instances cited by the
OLC opinion, protection of other countries' nationals was
49 Milton Offut, Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the




not the sole or principal reason for acting.
Many uses of force by the United States may have had
third-party beneficiaries that were not U.S. nationals, yet
the protection of such foreign nationals was either
not contemplated or not suggested as a justification for the
action. 51 Likewise, the U.S. has taken military actions
that were ostensibly for the benefit of foreign nationals,
but were carried out pursuant to a U.N. authorization (e.g.
the Congo, and, of course, Somalia) or pursuant to a mutual
defense agreement (Vietnam). 51 As this paper is exploring
uses of force to protect foreign nationals taken
independently, outside such agreements and U.N.
authorization, I have omitted discussion of these types of
cases below.
What follows are some of the more familiar examples of
U.S. military action this century where it has been
suggested that protection of foreigners was a justification
offered.
" E.g., the U.S. action in Panama in late 1989 in which the lawfully
elected President was restored to power, and the 1993-94 U.S. action in
Haiti. Both of these actions arguably stabilized situations which might
eventually have resulted in harm to other foreign nationals, although
both of these actions rested on some manner of consent or invitation by
the target country or (in the case of Panama) its putative
representatives
.
1 There of course remains considerable disagreement among scholars and
officials over whether the existence of a mutual defense obligation by




The Boxer Rebellion, China, 1900-1901
The United States sent forces to China in 1900 in
response to threats to all foreigners there by the Boxers,
the shorthand name given to members of the Chinese secret
society called "The Righteous and Harmonious Fists." The
Boxers had as their aim the purging of China of all
foreigners, and to that end directed quite brutal terrorism
against Christian missionaries and other non-Chinese,
primarily in the northeastern provinces. As the Boxers'
anti-foreigner actions continued and intensified, it became
clear that the Chinese government was either unable or
unwilling to control the Boxers and provide protection to
foreigners within its borders. 52
The U.S. responded, acting contemporaneously and in
concert with Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan in
mounting a relief operation. The multi-national expedition,
which included 5000 U.S. forces sent by President McKinley,
- In fact, the Imperial Chinese government was at once unable and
unwilling to prevent the attacks. While Chinese statements condemned
the attacks, there was ample evidence that elements of the Chinese
leadership, including the Dowager Empress Tz'u Hsi, , were actively
supporting the Boxers. While the Chinese Government did not invite the
intervention of the foreign powers, it ultimately viewed the U.S.
presence as somewhat helpful, as it viewed U.S. involvement as
supporting Chinese sovereignty and preventing dominance by other foreign
powers, notably Russia and Japan.
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relieved that portion of Beijing to which many of the non-
Chinese (as well as some 3000 Chinese Christians) had fled.
The force broke the Boxer seige of the foreign legations,
and occupied Beijing from August 14, 1900 to September 7,
1901, when the Chinese signed a peace treaty, the undeniably
one-sided "Boxer Protocol."
If the OLC opinion on Somalia meant to suggest that the
U.S. action in China was to protect foreign nationals, it
perhaps misstated the principle motivation and
justification for the expedition to China. In a circular
note of July 3, 1900, sent to various U.S. embassies and
missions, Secretary of State John Hay noted the purpose of
the U.S. action:
The purpose of the President is, as it has been
heretofore, to act concurrently with the other
powers; first, in opening up communication with
Pekin and rescuing the American officials
missionaries, and other Americans who are in
danger; secondly, in affording all possible
protection everywhere in China to American life
and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting
all legitimate American interests; and fourthly,
in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to
the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence
of such disasters. 53
Likewise, President McKinley, in a July 23, 1900, letter to
the Emperor of China explained, "The purpose for which we
landed troops in China was the rescue of our legation from
grave danger and the protection of the lives and property of
:




Americans who were sojourning in China in the enjoyment of
rights guaranteed them by treaty and by international
1 =>, 7 «» 54law
.
While the U.S. had expressed its concern over the
treatment of "foreigners," 55 to the extent that concern for
foreigners was the motivation for U.S. intervention, it was
the treatment of the American foreigners in China that
plainly prompted the U.S. action.
Given that the threat to the Americans in Beijing was
one shared by other non-Chinese, it was impossible for the
Americans to act against that threat without collateral
benefit to foreign nationals. That is far from suggesting,
however, that the protection of non-Americans was a primary
motivation for President McKinley's action, or that he would
have ordered the action had no Americans been threatened. It
is hardly precedent supporting any independent right for a
President to use force without authorization from Congress
for the protection of foreign nationals alone.
6
' Id. at 13.
5 See, e.g., Memorandum in response to the Russian charge's oral
communication made on August 28, 1900, to the Acting Secretary of State
touching the purposes of Russia in China. Acting Secretary of State
Alvey A. Adee writes:
While we agree that the immediate object for which the military
forces of the powers have been cooperating, viz, the relief of the
ministers at Pekin, has been accomplished there still remain the
other purposes which all the powers have in common.... These are:
To afford all possible protection everywhere in China to foreign
life and property; to guard and protect all legitimate foreign




The U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965
In April 1965 President Johnson without prior
authorization from Congress ordered U.S. Marines into the
Dominican Republic, as that country was engaged in a bloody
civil war. The country was by all accounts in complete chaos
following the overthrow of the President, Reid Cabral, by
the rebel "Constitutionalists." The conflict between Cabral
"Loyalists" and the Constitutionalists resulted in anarchy,
and the absence of any government which could guarantee the
safety of Americans or other foreigners in the country.
Armed mobs roamed the streets, engaging in indiscriminate
violence. As conditions worsened, the Marine contingent
grew from 400 to over 20, 000. 56
As recounted in the OLC opinion, the President
explained that he had ordered the action "to preserve the
lives of American citizens and of a good many other nations-
46 to be exact...." 57 U.S. Representative Adlai Stevenson
offered the U.S. rationale to the UN Security Council:
In the absence of any governmental authority,
Dominican law authority enforcement and military
officials informed our Embassy that the situation
was completely out of control, that the police and
the Government could no longer give any guarantee
concerning the safety of Americans or of any
56 The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965: Legal Aspects (The Ninth
Hammarskjbld Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, 1966) 8.
"An Assessment of the Situation in the Dominican Republic," 53 Dept
.
of State Bull. 19, 20 (1965), cited in OLC Somalia Opinion at 11.
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foreign nationals, and that only an immediate
landing of United States forces could safeguard
and protect the lives of thousands of Americans




A State Department memorandum justified the action as
"essential to preserve the lives of foreign nationals-
nationals of the United States and of many other
countries . " 59
From the outset, it was clear that it was protection of
American interests and lives which was the primary initial
stated justification for the action. It soon became
apparent, however, that the U.S. action was much more than a
rescue action—if it was ever that—and that "preventing
another Cuba" was an ultimate objective of the exercise,
prompted by concern about the Communist character of the
rebel force. 60 Whether the multiple rationales for the
operation that emerged suggest that the protection of
foreign nationals was never a serious focus of the operation
58 20 U.N. SCOR, 1196 th meeting, 3 May 1965, para. 67, reprinted in
Ronzetti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity 33, 34 (1985).
59 Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 33.
60 Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained:
What began in the Dominican Republic as a democratic revolution
was taken over by Communist conspirators who had been trained for
and had carefully planned that operation. Had they succeeded in
establishing a government, the Communist seizure of power would,
in all likelihood, have been irreversible, thus frustrating the
declared principles of the OAS . We acted to preserve the freedom
of choice of the Dominican people until the OAS could take charge
and insure that its principles were carried out.
Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk May 8, 1965 on communist
subversion, The Dominican Crisis, Dept. State Pub. 7971, Inter-American
Series 92 (1965), reprinted in pertinent part in The Dominican Republic
Crisis 1965: Legal Aspects, supra note 56, at 9.
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will no doubt be debated for years to come. A cynic might
suggest that the purpose of the President's claim to be
taking action to protect foreign nationals was to attract
international support for an operation whose true
purpose was likely to invite broad condemnation by the
international community. A country whose citizens had been
"saved" by American military might was unlikely to condemn
the action. 61 What is clear is that the protection of
foreign nationals was neither the sole or ultimately the
principal motivation for the U.S. military action in the
Dominican Republic.
The Indochina Rescue Operations, April 1975
In April 1975 President Ford, without authorization of
Congress, 62 undertook three military operations, all related
to the end of the U.S. presence in Indochina. All three
involved evacuation of Americans, and in all three, non-
Americans were also rescued.
61 Indeed, Great Britain, for example, publicly thanked the United States
for the assistance given its nationals. As Ronzetti notes, the
Netherlands, while not taking a position on the rationale for the
intervention, expressed approval "for the humanitarian aspects of the
United States operation which led to the saving of many lives, including
a number of Dutch nationals." 20 U.N. SCOR, 1203 ri meeting, 7 May 1965,
para. 4, cited in Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 34.
62 It is fairly clear that all of the 1975 Indochina operations were in
direct violation of Congressional prohibitions of appropriated funds
being used for military operations in Southeast Asia. This, of course,
does not settle the larger Constitutional question of whether the
Congress can by its appropriations power preclude the President from
fulfilling his Constitutional duties as Commander in Chief.
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The first operation, done pursuant to urgent appeals
from the South Vietnamese Government, involved the transport
of refugees from Danang and other seaports to areas farther
south in the country. The operation was undertaken as a
result of attacks on South Vietnam by North Vietnamese
forces. U.S. Naval units and Marines were authorized to
approach the South Vietnamese coast to pick up refugees. An
Amphibious Task Group, with 12 embarked helicopters and 700
Marines carried out the operation, which began on April 3,
1975. President Ford in his War Powers Resolution report to
the Congress underscored the non-combat nature of the
operation and his statutory authority under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended). 63
As the operation was undertaken at the request of the
South Vietnamese government, it was not an "intervention" in
any true sense. Although U.S. forces were used, and were
equipped for combat, President Ford described their mission
as solely to assist in evacuation and maintaining order on
board the vessels involved. While there were substantial
numbers of South Vietnamese assisted, the mission also
involved the rescue of U.S. nationals, and it is not all all
63 Report Dated April 4, 1975 From President Gerald R. Ford to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Consistent With Section
4(a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, Relative to the Transport of
Refugees from Danang, in The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents,
Reports, Correspondence, Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 47, 48 (May 1994 ed.).
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clear that the mission would have been undertaken had it not
included the protection of those U.S. citizens. 64
On April 11, 1975 the President ordered the evacuation
of Americans from Phnom Penh, as Communist forces were
advancing on the city. Some 350 Marine ground combat troops
and 36 helicopters evacuated 82 U.S. citizens. President
Ford reported that the task force "was also able to
accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians,
including employees of the U.S. Government." 6 ' Even though
the non-American evacuees outnumbered the Americans by more
than two-to-one, the President did not claim the operation
was for the purpose of rescuing the foreign nationals, and
noted their rescue almost as an aside. While there were no
combat injuries, and U.S. forces did not discharge any
weapons, President Ford reported that the last elements of
the force were fired upon. The President justified his
actions as being "pursuant to the President's Constitutional
executive power and authority as Commander-in-Chief. 66"
As the Cambodian rescue operation was underway, the
North Vietnamese were pressing forward into South Vietnam,
in violation of the Paris Peace Accords. The President
6i Id.
"Report Dated April 12, 1975, From President Gerald R. Ford to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Consistent With Section
4(a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, Relative to the Evacuation of U.S.
Nationals from Cambodia, in The War Powers Resolution: Relevant
Documents, Reports, Correspondence, supra note 63, at 49.
66 Id. at 50.
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ordered an evacuation of the remaining Americans in Saigon,
"together with foreign nationals whose lives were in
jeopardy." 67 As the situation worsened, the President
ordered a final emergency helicopter evacuation on April
29th. Seventy evacuation helicopters and 865 Marines
evacuated about 1400 U.S. citizens and 5500 third country
and South Vietnamese nationals. Again, although the foreign
nationals rescued outnumbered Americans by nearly four-to-
one, the President predicated the action on the "direct and
imminent threat to the remaining U.S. citizens and their
dependents in and around Saigon." 68 Again he asserted his
action was taken pursuant to his executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers.
Although in these latter two episodes it could be
argued that foreign nationals were the principal
beneficiaries of the military missions, in neither did the
President offer the "protection of foreign nationals" as
justification for his actions. None of the three episodes
involved solely the protection of foreign nationals, and in
none of the three episodes did President Ford fail to stress
that the operation included the rescue of Americans.
67 Report Dated May 15, 1975, From President Gerald R. Ford to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of House of Representives, Consistent With Section 4 (a)
1
of the War Powers Resolution , Relative to the Evacuation of U.S.
Citizens and Others From South Vietnam, in The War Powers Resolution:




The U.S. "Rescue Operation" in Grenada, October 1983
There were various justifications offered at various
times by various officials for the U.S. intervention in
Grenada. Principal among the reasons given, however, was
always the protection of U.S. nationals, specifically
concern about the safety of the U.S. students at St.
George's School of Medicine there. In announcing the
sending of troops into Grenada on October 23, President
Reagan noted his principal reason for the action: "First,
and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives,
including up to 1,000 Americans whose personal safety is, of
course, my paramount concern." 69 While President Reagan had
noted the protection of innocent lives generally, in which
he included Americans, Secretary of State George Schultz,
more plainly stated on 25 October that the primary concern
was "the welfare of American citizens living on Grenada.
"
7C
The President's letter to House Speaker O'Neill pursuant to
the War Powers Resolution restated his concern about "the
safety of innocent lives on the island, including those of
69 Announcement of the Sending of U.S. Troops Into Grenada, in American
Foreign Policy Current Documents: 1983 1398 (1985)
Events Leading to Presidential Decision to Commit U.S. Forces to
Grenada, Id. at 1401.
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up to 1,000 United States citizens." 71 The U.S. statement to
the Organization of American States on 26 October noted the
U.S. concern for the safety of its citizens, but also noted
that "The lack of respect for human rights and the
degenerating conditions, of course, also posed a threat to
other foreign nationals and, indeed, to the people of
Grenada" 72 and noting, "Such humanitarian action has long
been recognized as consistent with international law." 7 '
By November 4th some 599 Americans and 121 foreigners
had been evacuated from the country. 74
While debate was intense over other reasons offered for
the action, and whether the "protection of nationals"
justification was wholly compelling, it was clear that this
was the primary stated rationale of the United States.
Although various references were made to the safety of non-
U.S. citizens, perhaps in an effort to broaden international
support for the action, protection of foreign nationals was
never explicitly given as a legal justification in any of
the U.S. statements on the matter.
71 President's Report to Congress on Deployment of U.S. Troops in
Grenada., Id. at 1407.
: U.S. Explanation of Its Actions and Objectives in Grenada, Id. at
1408, 1409.
73 Id. at 1409.
74 The Origins, Development, and Impact of U.S. Participation in the
Grenada Mission (Address by the Dep. Sec. Of State (Dan) Before the
Associated Press Managing Editors' Conference, Louisville, Ken.,
November 4, 1983, Id. at 1420.
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The Liberian Rescue Operation, August 1990
The worsening civil war in Liberia had by June 1990
made more likely the eventual need to evacuate the U.S.
citizens there. Toward that end the U.S. moved several
Naval units off West Africa, and had advised all Americans
in that country to leave immediately. The Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs signaled that the
U.S. was prepared to use military forces for the purpose of
evacuation, but stressed there was "no intention of using
these forces for any political ends: they are there to
preserve American lives.... [We] will not intervene to stop
the fighting or to influence the outcome of the conflict in
any way. " 75
On August 5th U.S. Marines went ashore by helicopter
and began the evacuation. When the operation ended several
weeks later, some 1,000 non-Liberians had been evacuated
from Liberia, including nationals from some 58 nations other
than the U.S. 76
b Prepared Statement by the Asst. Secretary of State for African Affairs
(Cohen) June 19, 1990, in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1990
800 (1991)
.
5 Press Briefing by the President's Press Secretary (Fitzwater) August
5, 1990 (Extract), Id. at 803. The President in his War Powers
Resolution letter to House Speaker Foley noted that as of 6 August (the
day after the operation began) , some 62 American citizens and a limited
number of foreign nationals had been removed to U.S. ships. Report
Dated August 6, 1990, From President George Bush to Hon. Thomas S.
Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Consistent With Section
4(a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, Relative to the Use of United
States Armed Forces in Liberia, in The War Powers Resolution: Relevant
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The U.S. military action, although ultimately of great
help to potentially endangered third-country nationals, was
never justified on the basis of assisting those persons.
The only rationale ever offered was the protection of U.S.
citizens. The operation, which was a "pure" rescue
operation, was conducted without hostilities of any sort,
even though the operation did not have the formal approval
of the Liberian government. 77
Some Conclusions About U.S. Practice
While the examples of U.S. use of force for the
protection of foreign nationals are not voluminous, from the
foregoing instances one can draw several conclusions:
1. The U.S. has asserted the right to use force to
protect foreign nationals as justification for the use of
military force. The principle example of the U.S. offering
this justification was the 1965 Dominican Republic
intervention
.
2. The U.S. has not offered protection of foreign
nationals as the sole justification for the use of force.
In each case discussed, including the Dominican Republic
operation, the U.S. use of force was offered as one of two
Documents, Reports, Correspondence, supra note 63, at 146. See also,
A. Arend & R. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force 102 (1993)
.
77 A. Arend & R. Beck, supra note 76, at 102.
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or more justifications for action.
3. The U.S. has not used protection of foreign
nationals as the primary justification for military action.
In those cases where use of force to protect foreign
nationals was, or could have been, cited as justification
for military action, the U.S. has not announced such
rationale as its primary one. Always it has been at best
secondary, after protection of our own nationals or some
other vindication of American interests.
4. The U.S. has chosen in some cases not to justify
its use of force by the protection of foreign nationals
,
even when, as in the Indochina rescue operations, the
protection or rescue of foreign nationals was a primary
portion of a particular operation.
5. The most frequent pairing of the justification of
protecting foreign nationals came with justification of the
protection of U.S. nationals
.
6. The President has used force to protect foreign
nationals without prior authorization of the Congress , but
has done so in situations where he has a stronger basis for
unilateral action, specifically, his powers as Commander in
Chief to protect U.S. nationals
.
7. The U.S. Congress has not taken action to condemn
the President' s use of force in such situations, although
the lack of any precedent of Presidential use of force
40

solely for the protection of foreign nationals makes it
impossible to predict what Congressional response might be
in such a case. Given the lack of such a discrete use of
force by the Executive, Congress cannot be said to have
acquiesced in the view that the Executive can use force for
such a purpose without Congressional authorization.
8. The U.S. has used force to protect foreign nationals
both where there has been consent from the national'
s
government and/or the government of the target country, and
in cases where such consent has been lacking. The presence
or absence of such consent does not appear to be have been
critical in the decision whether force should be employed to
protect foreign nationals.
What is apparent from the cases reviewed is that the
Executive Branch, although willing to use force to protect
foreign nationals, and willing to do without Congressional
authorization, is apparently in practice wary of placing
much emphasis on this rationale. Whether this wariness is a
result of Executive unease of being able to so act within
the Commander in Chief powers, or concern about the
international law footing of such action, (or perhaps both)
,
is not clear. What is clear that far from being the
independent, stand-alone justification for Executive use of
force suggested by the OLC opinion, the actual practice of
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the U.S. suggests a much less important standing given to
this rationale for military intervention.
THE USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The uneasiness that U.S. practice reflects might be a
result of the general lack of acceptance that such use of
force has in the international community in the post-U.N.
Charter world. One must presume that the OLC opinion,
however, when giving its legal imprimatur to the President's
use of force for the protection of foreign nationals, was of
the view that such use of force was valid under
international law. The opinion correctly stressed the
international law basis for the President's action in U.N.
Resolution 794. It is nonetheless unfortunate given the
breadth of the authority it suggests for the President to
intervene on behalf of foreign nationals, that it did not
discuss where any independent right to such intervention can
be found in international law.
What is striking about the OLC opinion is the extent to
which it claims a right of intervention far beyond that, for
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example, delineated by Monroe Leigh in 1975. 7I Not only is
the use of military force available for protection of third-
country nationals, but it extends to Somalis within Somalia
as well. 7! This language suggests that the Justice
Department has not drawn a distinction between limited
intervention for purposes of rescue, and a broader doctrine
of intervention for humanitarian purposes.
Consideration of the possible bases under international
law justifying intervention to protect foreign nationals
will highlight the difficulties with the U.S. position.
Intervention as an Analog to
Protection of One' s Nationals Abroad
It is easy to try to justify such intervention as part
and parcel of intervention to protect one's own nationals.
Indeed, as noted above, the two are in practice frequently,
if not always, connected. The basic concern underlying the
intervention is often identical, as the threat to the U.S.
national may be indistinguishable from that faced by his
non-U. S. counterpart. The actual operation proposed for
protecting the U.S. national may be indistinguishable from
one mounted to protect the non-U. S. national. The extent to
which the sovereignty of the nation into which forces are
inserted has been violated may be identical in the two
3 War Powers: A Test of Compliance, supra note 41.
79 See OLC Somalia Opinion at 11.
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circumstances. These similarities, alone, however, do not
hide the basic differences in the legal underpinning of the
two situations. Just as under domestic law it is difficult
to consider an operation to protect foreign nationals as
equating to "repelling a sudden attack," likewise it is
difficult to define such an operation in international law
as an act of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter.
The U.S. has long taken the view that armed
intervention to protect American lives and property is
permissible as self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter. 80 That view, it must be acknowledged, is by no
means accepted by the majority of states, and must be
considered the minority position. 81 Nonetheless, even
assuming such action is permissible under the Charter, it in
no way follows that action to protect non-nationals is also.
While one might be able to conceptually equate danger to
one' s nationals with the Charter' s "armed attack" against
' The U.S., for example, strongly supported Israel's 1976 raid on
Uganda's Entebbe airport to rescue its nationals. While conceding that
there was a breach of Uganda's territorial integrity contrary to the
U.N. Charter, the U.S. representative declared that "there is a well-
established right to use limited force for the protection of one's
national from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where
the State in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or
unable to protect them." U.N. Doc. S/PV 1949, 12 July 1976 at 31-32,
cited in Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 38.
31 See A. Arend & R. Beck, supra note 76, at 109, 110. Arend and Beck
note, however, that "Of these states which have had both the cause and
capacity to use force..., all appear consistently to have claimed their
right to do so." "Such behavior," they note, " while perhaps not
guantitatively significant, is nevertheless gualitatively so." Id. at
110. See also, Brownlie, supra note 24, at 298-301.
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the state, it is impossible to do the same with a foreign
national victim who does not have the same nexus with the
state as the citizen. Indeed, if the action cannot be seen
as self-defense, it would seem plainly to fall under the
general prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of
the Charter.
Protecting Foreign Nationals
as an Act of Collective Self-Defense
Another possible justification for the use of force to
protect foreign nationals is collective self-defense, when
the action is taken pursuant to a request by a third country
for the U.S. to protect its nationals. In that situation,
the action to protect the foreign nationals would be
analogous to the action taken to protect one's own
nationals, and would rest upon a much firmer legal position
than action taken unilaterally to protect foreign nationals
without the request of those nationals' governments. As
noted above, by no means has the U.S. always sought the
request or permission of third states when rescuing their
nationals, even where, as in the Dominican Republic, that
was a stated rationale for the operation. 82 This is no
doubt in part out of concern that the blessing of the
allegedly threatened national's home country might not be




If the protection of foreign nationals is to be based
on notions of collective self defense, such actions to be
legal would need to be guided by the Caroline case
principles of necessity and proportionality, that is, limited
to strictly what was necessary to protect the lives at
stake. While U.S. action in Liberia might be of such a
character, few would argue that the prolonged presence of
U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic would meet the
Caroline criteria. Likewise such action taken in collective
self-defense would need to meet the UN Charter requirement
that the action be reported immediately to the Security
Council. 84 Article 51 also arguably limits the inherent
right of self-defense to that period "until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." 85
One difficulty with collective self-defense as a
rationale is that it fails to provide a basis for taking
action to protect a national of a state from his own
government. It could not justify action taken to remove
from Saigon Vietnamese loyal to the U.S., or efforts to
protect Liberians seeking protection from their country's
1 In Grenada, for example, it is highly unlikely that Britain would have
given its blessing for the U.S. action, even though there was ample
evidence that UK nationals on the island might have been at risk.
84
"Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of
[collective] self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council..." UN Charter Art. 51.
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civil war. The use of force to protect Somalis, as
suggested by the OLC opinion, could not be based on
collective self-defense. 86
Collective self-defense by its nature also cannot
address situations in which third countries, for political
or other reasons, simply do not wish to see another country
protect its nationals abroad, even at the expense of those
nationals' lives. How then, can a state take action to
protect threatened foreigners if the consent or request of
the threatened nationals' home state is lacking?
Perhaps the only way to address situations where it is
not possible to obtain such consent or request for reasons
of politics, lack of communication or lack of time to
consult, is to recognize a doctrine of "constructive
consent." In those cases in which it is clear that any
civilized nation would wish its nationals to be protected
under the circumstances, and where they themselves would act
to protect those nationals if it were possible, the consent
should be presumed. This narrow legal fiction would allow
nations with the capacity to assist foreign nationals to do
so in urgent situations without waiting for the diplomatic
process to work, by which time in cases of true emergency
85 Id.
86 If the Somali authorities acquiesced in the military action to protect
Somalis it would thus not be intervention, in the true sense of the
concept, as their would be consent for the action. If there were not
consent, action taken to protect Somali nationals would be in opposition
to the desires and sovereignty of Somalia, not pursuant to it.
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terrible consequences might result.
While I believe such a narrow concept would be useful
in those situations (perhaps few in the era of instant
communication) where action to protect threatened foreign
nationals must be immediate, it may be that a notion of
"constructive consent" is at odds with the International
Court of Justice's decision in Nicaragua v. United States of
America. 61 Though the I.C.J, did not address the issue of
using force for the protection of foreign nationals, it did
stress that "There is no rule in customary international law
permitting another State to exercise the right of collective
self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the
situation" and that the victim state must declare itself a
victim. 88 Moreover, the Court noted that in customary
international law "there is no rule permitting the exercise
of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by
the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed
attack." 69 While the Court's decision is not binding on
those not party to the case, to the extent the decision
actually reflects customary international law, it may
preclude acceptance of a doctrine of "constructive consent."
However, if the doctrine were applied as narrowly as I
suggest, in situations as dire and immediate as those
1 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Judgement).
88 Id. , at para. 195.
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contemplated, it is unlikely that there would be
condemnation of such actions, particularly if they were
ratified as soon as possible after the fact by the
threatened nationals' home state.
Protection of Foreign Nationals
As Humanitarian Intervention
Almost all operations to rescue or protect foreign
nationals have a humanitarian element, and this fact
understandably propels the state wishing to use force in
such situations toward considering arguments of humanitarian
intervention. 9 ' Humanitarian intervention, as the term is
used by many, connotes the protection of a target state's
citizens from large-scale human rights violations in or by
the target state. 91 This is not always the case where the
U.S. might seek to protect foreign nationals. For example,
they may be--and perhaps usually are-- third-country
nationals in a hostile state, such as the European diplomats
in China in 1900. Many such situations are not on a large
scale
.
The reason "humanitarian intervention" has been defined
so narrowly is to avoid the obvious abuses that a broadly
89 Id. , at para. 199.
See, e.g., U.S. Explanation of its Actions and Objectives in Grenada,
supra note 72, at 1408, 1409.
91 See, e.g., A. Arend & R. Beck, supra note 76, at 113. They define
humanitarian intervention as "the use of and force by a state (or
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defined doctrine might invite. Efforts to formulate a
doctrine of humanitarian intervention are usually directed
at setting a "floor" for action high enough to preclude such
abuses. Indeed, it is this "slippery slope" problem (and
the constraints of the Charter) which have prevented
acceptance of unilateral intervention for this purpose, even
in large-scale humanitarian catastrophes. If the slippery
slope exists when the threshold for action is contingent on
massive suffering, it surely exists for more limited rescue
actions
.
Louis Henkin has argued that there exists a narrow
humanitarian exception of sorts to Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. This exception allows a nation to use force, not
only for protection of its own nationals, but pursuant to a
general "right to liberate hostages if the territorial state
cannot or will not do so." 92 While Henkin' s narrow
formulation undoubtedly seeks to avoid the "slippery slope"
of a broader doctrine of humanitarian intervention, I
believe that it suffers from being too narrow, a defect that
I believe would result in its being applied too broadly.
There are many situations—if not most—where foreign
nationals in need of rescue are not hostages or prisoners,
but rather are caught in cross-fire (as in Liberia) or




otherwise trapped by circumstances. Indeed, few of the
instances described above which involved the United States
were true hostage situations. Given the extreme narrowness
of Henkin' s hostage exception, there might well be strong
incentive for states to interpret it in an overbroad
fashion, not only rendering the term "hostage" meaningless
(e.g., by including those "hostage" to a circumstance), but
thereby ultimately inviting the same sort of slippery slope
problems Henkin seeks to avoid.
It has been observed that there have been few, if any,
instances of true humanitarian intervention by states since
the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. 93 On the other hand, there have been significant
examples of states claiming to intervene for pure
humanitarian reasons, including the Egyptian intervention in
Palestine in 1948, the Indian intervention in East Pakistan
in 1971, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978.
Perhaps the most notorious example of claimed humanitarian
intervention was Hitler's 1939 invasion of Czechoslovakia to
protect the German-origin population there from "wild
excesses." 94 If the U.S. resorts to humanitarian
justifications for armed intervention to protect foreign
; L. Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might:
International Law and the Use of Force 41-42 (1991)
.
3 Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 91. (See also, A. Arend & R. Beck, supra
note 76 at 135; they also conclude that "genuine instances of
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nationals, it must be prepared to entertain claims from the
other nations of the world who will find such a
justification convenient for their intervention on behalf of
Serbians in Bosnia, ethnic Russians in the former Soviet
Republics, and the like. For these reasons, humanitarian
intervention when undertaken is probably best left to the
U.N. Security Council.
Absent a raw doctrine of necessity, then, there is
little satisfactory international law basis for armed
intervention on behalf of threatened foreign nationals that
covers every possible situation. While this apparent gap in
the legal regime of the use of force might trouble some, one
could argue that it is in fact not a "gap" at all, but
rather serves to encourage states to take action under the
auspices of the Security Council or, if they should act on
their own, to do so with some other more accepted
justification as their primary one. This, of course, has
been the U.S. practice.
WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. POLICY BE?
What then should the U.S. position be? There will
surely be instances arising again where the U.S. will feel
humanitarian intervention have been rare, if they have occurred at
all.")
"Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 91.
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compelled to use its military might to alleviate threats to
nationals of other nations. Indeed, not acting to assist
threatened foreign nationals would have serious consequences
of loss of prestige and ultimately could be reciprocated in
the care given our nationals abroad by other nations.
Imagine the U.S. helicopters leaving Liberia in 1990 without
those non-American civilians who were just as threatened as
were the Americans. Consider the fate of those non-
Americans we evacuated from Indochina, had we instead felt
legally compelled to leave them behind. These sorts of
emergency situations will ultimately demand that the U.S.
extend its hand to those threatened, so the U.S. should have
a well-grounded and consistent policy and view of the law,
not only to guide its actions in the first place, but also
to defend its actions if criticism results.
Rather than being guided solely by realpolitik,
however, and thus force ourselves to accept the same
behavior from the other nations of the world, the U.S. would
benefit from articulating a legal position allowing as well-
defined a scope of action as possible in acting to protect
foreign nationals. The U.S. should avoid the illogical
"self-defense" argument (unless acting in collective self-
defense), and should shun a "humanitarian" justification for
its actions. While U.S. practice has already developed the
outlines of a position, it has done so haphazardly and
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somewhat erratically, and apparently driven by its defenses
of actions already taken.
It seems to me the Monroe Leigh formulation is too
constraining. Limiting the beneficiaries of our rescue
actions to those who actually facilitate the rescue or
protection of Americans would still result in many foreign
nationals left unprotected when U.S. forces were able to
afford them relief. Many of those evacuated from Indochina
and Liberia were probably not actually "facilitating" the
rescue of Americans at all. I believe rather than trying to
draw difficult and unworkable distinctions that attempt to
cover every case (e.g., who is facilitating the rescue, and
who is simply standing by), the focus of U.S. policy should
be on avoiding as much as possible those evils which Article
2(4) seeks to guard against: namely, intrusions upon
territorial integrity and political independence.
Any action taken to assist foreign nationals in a state
that has not offered its consent to force being used for
that purpose does to some extent impinge on that state's
territorial integrity, if not political independence as
well. How can this be minimized when seeking to protect
threatened foreign nationals?
I would offer the following general principles to be




1. Absent a mutual defense arrangement or request from
a threatened national's state for the U.S. to act in
collective self-defense, 95 the U.S. should not take
action solely to protect foreign nationals without
Security Council authority or the host country's
consent
.
2. If the contemplated U.S. military action has as a
primary purpose the rescue or protection of U.S.
citizens, U.S. forces may extend their protection to
third-country nationals when such action is
necessary to effect the protection of U.S.
nationals, or in other cases if such protection does
not result in greater violations of the host
country' s sovereignty than would be the case were we
acting solely to protect our nationals, and the time
needed to effect the operation is not significantly
extended by the protection of such nationals.
This formulation recognizes the desirability of acting where
possible pursuant to previously agreed-upon arrangements
(consent, Security Council resolutions, mutual defense
treaties) and in situations not involving U.S. nationals or
interests, pursuant to requests from the threatened
nationals' state. This half of the policy would act to




deter abuses which could occur were there no constraints on
using force to protect foreign nationals or were the
relatively amorphous and easily feigned "humanitarian"
concerns the only guide. The second half of the policy
would tie other protective actions to (presumably) legal
uses of force under the UN Charter, principally the
protection of U.S. nationals. When coinciding with such
uses of force the policy would allow protective actions,
without the rather strained and fictional determination of
whether the action was "facilitating" the rescue of
Americans or was otherwise inseparable from it. It would,
however, seek to protect the Article 2(4) values of
territorial integrity and political independence, by
effectively limiting the protective action to no greater
intervention than would occur were foreign nationals not
being protected.
These same principles would also neatly mirror the
likely limits of Executive action without Congressional
authorization. While a protective operation undertaken as
collective self-defense pursuant to another government's
request might exceed the President's Commander in Chief
powers, the bulk of actions to protect foreigners would
undoubtedly continue to be taken in tandem with actions to
protect U.S. nationals, within the traditional scope of
action of the Executive. The limits implicit in the
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formulation above on expansion of an operation beyond what
is needed to protect U.S. nationals, would ensure the
President did not "bootstrap" a more extensive military




The U.S. will surely be called upon again to protect
the nationals of other countries because of its military
strength, worldwide presence and perceived willingness to
use force in defense of its interests. Again this month
violence has broken out in Liberia, and again the U.S.
military is looked to, not only by stranded Americans, but
also by other foreigners there, for protection and safe
passage out of harm's way. As the U.S. seeks to act
responsibly and in accordance with international law, the
first step should be to formulate and enunciate a limited
doctrine for using force to protect or rescue non-U. S.
citizens. As the President seeks to use force within his
powers as Commander in Chief, he should seek the greater
confidence and freedom of action afforded by a clear
statement on the extent to which the Executive can use force
to protect foreigners in peril. The U.S. use of force to
protect foreigners may well be condemned by other nations no
matter how limited and defined the action may be. Such
action, though, is infinitely more defensible when it is
executed in accordance with established U.S. practice and
consistent with a coherent and well-articulated view of
international law under the UN Charter.
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